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A Module for Media Intervention: Content Regulation in Post-Conflict Zones
Abstract
During the past decade a number of bloody conflicts have focused international attention on the strategic
role of the media in promoting war and perpetuating chaos. The challenges posed by systematic
manipulation of the media have been particularly acute in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor - wherever
the international community intervened to prevent atrocities, or stop them, or help rebuild society in their
aftermath. Written against this backdrop, Forging Peace brings together case studies and legal analysis
of the steps that the United Nations, NATO and other organisations, both governmental and nongovernmental, have taken to build pluralist and independent media in the wake of massive human rights
violations. Forging Peace maps an important aspect of contemporary peacemaking. It examines current
thinking on the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, then analyses in graphic detail the
pioneering use of information intervention techniques in conflict zones, ranging from full-scale
bombardment and confiscation of transmitters to the establishment of new laws and regulatory regimes.
As the social and economic role of the media expands and information technology spreads, driving
governments in the world's trouble spots to seek more sophisticated ways of controlling public opinion,
Forging Peace looks set to influence policy and debate for years to come.
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Constructing the Module
The Module in a Constitutional Order

A Module for Media Intervention: Content
Regulation in Post-Conflict Zones
Peter Krug and Monroe E. Price

Introduction
In the late 1990s, an institutional structure - an 'architecture of media law' emerged in post-conflict zones for the temporary generation and application of
norms regulating mass media content during the transition from international
to domestic governance. 1 The creation of this system for post-conflict information intervention, which we will call a 'module' to illustrate its incipient
nature, was predicated on the belief that a self-contained set of formal rules and
procedures - a system of law - is necessary in the absence of an operating
domestic legal regime in order to respond adequately to purportedly abusive
media content and at the same time to provide safeguards protecting the
exercise of expressive rights recognized under international standards. 2,3
The module first appeared with the establishment of the Independent Media
Commission (IMC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998. 4 It was borrowed by
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and has undergone refinement since the establishment in Kosovo of the office of the Temporary Media
Commissioner (TMC) in June 2000. 5 In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Kosovo, it is being phased out, to give way to yet another new structure in an
interim system of governance more closely tied to local institutions and
personnel. 6
It is likely that the module will be considered for use in future post-conflict
settings, as well as exerting some influence on the further development of media
regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo~ this chapter, we examine
aspects of the module's structure, normative base, and process, and seek to
identify its implications for development of a law of information intervention if
indeed it is gaining traction as a portable 'fix' for employment in the increasing
number of transitory post-conflict environments. Because it represents a
refinement of the module, we will focus on the Kosovo (UNMIK) system
while making references to its predecessor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do not
claim to have many complete answers; instead, we merely hope to raise useful
questions and to suggest perspectives from which to judge whether the module's
components are consistent with applicable international standards.

!he module is a component of those systems of civil governance established b
. 1
..
8
Y
I~ternatlOna orgamzatlOns in post-conflict zones. It operates as an internatIOnal system imposed on a post-conflict territory in the absence of a function. d
. 1
9
mg omestic egal system. Because it serves equivalent purposes, we seek to
assess the module the way we would a domestic system of media content
regulation, starting with its constitutional foundations and then analyzing its
st~u~ture, rules, and procedures. It must be seen not in isolation, but instead
withm a larger constitutional order that presents an institutional structure and a
set of fundamental norms with which all governing acts -legislative executive
'
,
and judicial - must comply.
In Kosovo, the basic document for the UNMIK administration is Security
Council Resolution 1244, enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
lO
Char:er. In ~ection 6, Resolution 1244 authorized the secretary-general to
appomt a SpecIal Representative (the SRSG) to control the implementation of
the international civil presence in Kosovo. In turn, the SRSG ordered th
·h
.
11
e
esta bl IS ment of the TMC m June 2000. The nature of this structure means
that the module is part of a chain of delegation and supervisory responsibility
th~t extends back from the TMC to the SRSG, the UN secretary-general, and
ultImately to the UN Security Council. 12
In addition to structure, an essential component of the UNMIK constituti?n~l orde~ is. th~ fo~mal rec?gnition of fundamental norms that are legally
bmdmg on ItS mstItutlOns. UltImately, the basis for these lies in Articles 55 and
~6 of t~e United Nations Charter and in recognition of the principle that
mt~rnatlOnal organizations are bound to observe human rights norms. Meanwh~le, :hese general principles have received greater specificity via the SRSG's
legIslatIve enactments in UNMIK Regulations 1999/1 and 1999/24. UNMIK
Regulation 1999/1, Section 2 ('Observance of internationally recognized
standards'), states in full:
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or
holding ~ublic office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized
human nghts standards and shall not discriminate against any person on
an~ ~round ~uch as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other
opmlOn, natIOnal, ethnic or social origin, association with a national
community, property, birth or other status. 13
Regulation 1999/24, Section l.3, is even more specific, stating that:
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or
holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized
human rights standards, as reflected in particular in: The European
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Protocols thereto; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and
the Protocols thereto; ... [and] The Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965.
Of this list, the European Convention is particularly noteworthy, both for the
fact that it is the only regional instrument included and the fact that, at least in
the field of mass media law, the media regulatory authorities in Kosovo have
identified Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and, along with it, the Article 10
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as the basis
. t h e parameters 0 f t h e1r
. activity.
.. 14' 15,16
for definmg
We also make an assumption that is important for our analysis: that the
UNMIK institutions are bound by certain general principles of law that have
been recognized by domestic legal systems and supranational and international
organizations. 17 Of these, we are particularly concerned with separation of
powers principles, such as the independence of prosecutors from the legislative
and executive branches and provision of independent review of executive and
prosecutorial acts.

The Module as a Self-Contained System of Governance
The module is a self-contained, law-based international regulatory system
separate from any domestic legal regime, with a legislator promulgating
generally applicable binding norms, a standing authority empowered to
prosecute perceived violations of those norms, and control mechanisms
designed to supervise the prosecutor's acts.
The norms applicable to the mass media are generated from within this
structure rather than from an outside source. In Kosovo, this legislative
function is performed by the SRSG, who issues generally-applicable normative
r'
.
f unctlOns.'
.
1819 The mo du Ie ' s essent'la I
. add"ltlon to penormmg
acts m
executlve
nature is defined by its core institution: a multi-dimensional agency that
monitors the media, performs administrative functions such as the granting
of broadcast licences, and acts as the prosecutor for imposition of sanctions for
violations of the normative base. We will call this agency, which in Kosovo has
been the Temporary Media Commissioner and in Bosnia and Herzegovina the
Director-General, the 'Regulator'. (Before March 2001, when the IMC was
merged with the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency to form the Communications Regulatory Agency, the IMC was headed by a 'Director-General'.
The focus of our study is the IMC and the TRA before the merger.)
In Kosovo, the core of the Regulator's prosecutorial duties is found in the
SRSG's authorization to the TMC to monitor media content and fashion
remedies, including the imposition of sanctions, if the normative base is
breached. 2o For example, as to print media, UNMIK Regulation 2000/37,
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Secti~n 2, autho:izes the ~MC to impos~ one or more of the fOllowing
sanctlOns: a warnmg; a reqUIrement to pubhsh a reply, correction or apology'
a fi~e of not less tha~ DM 1,00? and not exceeding DM 100,000; seizure of
eqUIpment and/or pnnted matenal; or suspension or closure of operations. 21
The module's framers also have developed institutions for control of the
Regulator's acts. In Kosovo, for example, the TMC cannot impose sanctions
on the media without a finding by a three-member Media Hearings Board
(MHB) that the normative base has been violated. 22 Also, the Kosovo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina systems both provide for appellate review of sanctioning decisions. In Kosovo, the three-member Media Appeals Board (MAB) is
empowered to uphold, modify, or rescind any TMC sanctioning decision. 23 ,24
In all, the structural elements of the module suggest that attention has been paid
to concerns about provision of safeguards against unconstrained, arbitrary acts by
the prosecutorial authorities. However, further assessment of the effectiveness of
the system in this regard, including the crucial question of the independence of the
control mechanisms, requires evaluation of the normative base and the practical
implementation of the module, to which we now turn.
Normative Base
The module is predicated on the conclusion that some form of content
supervision and regulation is necessary in post-conflict zones and further
that such action will be effective only if there is in place a body of'generall;
applicable norms: that is, a formal system of law rather than an ad hoc
approach. This conclusion reflects adherence to the general principle that
prosecution can be based on no grounds other than those rules published and in
existence at the time of the offence. 25
In the module, it is accepted that the normative base is temporary (although
indefinite) pending return to domestic rule. While in force, however, the rules
of the normative base represent the sum total of the Regulator's enforcement
mandate. The temporariness of the rules may be of only cosmetic interest when
it comes to the legality of the norms. Unconscionable rules, for example, could
not be justified because of their short-lived nature.
With the exception of laws in effect in Kosovo in 1989, the normative base
comprises solely SRSG Regulations and supplementary acts in the form of
Codes of Conduct, drafted by the TMC and promulgated as binding law by the
SRSG, for the print and broadcast media. 26,27 The centrepiece of this
normative base is found in provisions of SRSG Regulations 2000/36 and
2000/37, promulgated by the SRSG on 17 June, 2000. Because of the central
place it has occupied in the TMC's prosecutorial activity, a key provision is
Section 4.1 of SRSG Regulation 2000/37, which states in full:
Owners, operators, publishers and editors shall refrain from publishing
personal details of any person, including name, address or place of work, if
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the publication of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety
or security of any such person through vigilante violence or otherwise.
SRSG Regulation 2000/36, Section 5.1, applies exactly the same prohibition to
'Radio and Television Operators'. Another element in the normative base is the
earlier SRSG Regulation 2000/4, 'On the Prohibition against Inciting to
National Racial Religious or Ethnic Hatred, Discord, or Intolerance' promulgated on I February 2000 [the 'Hate Speech Regulation']'
The Codes of Conduct present more detailed rules. For purposes of
examining the regulatory scheme in Kosovo, we focus on the Code of Conduct
for the print media, since it is the instrument that has been applied most often
in the TMC's prosecutorial practice. The Code's rules governing content and
editorial practice are found in the following provisions:
Section 2 (Provocative Statements)
2.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material
that encourages crime or criminal activities or which carries imminent
risk of causing harm, such harm being defined as death, or injury, or
damage to property or other violence.
2.2. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material
that denigrates an ethnic or religious group or implies that an ethnic or
religious group is responsible for criminal activity.
Section 3 (Privacy)
3.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material,
that by intent or effect attributes criminal responsibility to any individual
prior to a finding of guilt by a lawfully constituted tribunal.
3.2. Publishers will protect the identity of, and will not reveal the names,
description, photograph, the likeness of, or specific information about
any individual alleged to have committed a crime, unless authorities
responsible for the administration of justice have expressly authorized the
publication of such information, or unless the individual has been found
guilty of the crime by a lawfully constituted tribunal.
Section 5 (Separation of News and Opinion)
Publishers, while free to express their own views, will make every effort
to distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture, and fact and will
clearly entitle editorials and commentaries as such.
Section 6 (False and Deceptive Material)
6.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute material that
they know or ought to know to be false or deceptive.
6.2. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute material unless
they have undertaken a prudent and reasonable inquiry to ensure the
veracity of the material.
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Section 7 (Right of Reply)
7.1. Publishers will extend a right of reply when they have writt
. d
.
en,

pn~te .' p~blI~hed, or distributed content that places a person, group or
~n mstr:utIOn m.an unfavourable light, if fairness and impartiality require
It. PublIshers wIll ensure that the reply is given equal prominence to the
unfavourable content.

7.2. If printed, published or distributed content proves to be false
publishers will print, publish and distribute a correction as soon a~
possi~le. Publishers will ensure that the correction is given equal
prommence to the false content.
The catalo~ue of rules fo~~d in the normative base is gathered from a variety of
sources. It mcludes prOVISIOns commonly found in domestic legal systems such
as thos~ prohibiting advocacy of violence and protecting individual repu~ation
and pnvacy, as well as prohibitions, such as those found in Section 2.2 and
Reg~lation ~000/4, that are grounded in international conventions. 28,29 It might
be v~ewed, m effect, as an incipient international, or extra-state, law of news
medIa content regulation that embellishes norms found in existing international
instruments. 30
The SRSG and TMC made selective decisions as to the content of the

nor~ative base, not merely absorbing into the module a set of rules from any
partIcular legal system. It was important to the SRSG to claim that input was
sought 3from local groups and foreign organizations during the drafting
process. !
Viewed in broad perspective, the key characteristic of the normative base is
that it reflects the precarious and recurrent tension in human rights law
between free expression guarantees and the validity of interferences with
the right of free expression, especially where the countervailing interest is
protection of individual right to physical security. Care should be taken to
consider whether those elements that are contemplated as a surrogate Code of
Conduct are of a different quality (from a free expression point of view) from
those rules that are akin to domestic law. While the set of rules may find
counterparts in domestic settings, many elements might conflict with various
constitutional frameworks, such as that established by the First Amendment of
the US Constitution. For the UNMIK authorities, the resolution of this
tenSion. is ~ound in the emphasis on a particular vision of 'media responsibility',
one whIch mcorporates, along with traditional aspects ofIegal regulation, major
elements of professional journalistic ethics as well. This is in keeping with the
Kosovo normative structure itself, which makes the Codes of Conduct legally
binding and enforceable.
The. emphasis on this vision of media responsibility was set forth by the
TMC m a lengthy statement disseminated to the public on 9 March 2001 in
which the TMC defended the imposition of monetary fines on two newspap~rs
B
S
32
,
ota ot and Epoka eRe. The statement includes these excerpts:
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[W]hat has resulted is a general misunderstanding of the substantive
issues on which these cases were argued. The editors of the newspap~rs
concerned are failing yet again in their principal duty, that of educatlllg
and informing their readers [ ...] Achieving the right bal~nc~ between
freedom on the one hand and accountability on the other lS dlfficult: It
may be a cliche, but does freedom of speech allow a per~on to yell fire III a
crowded theatre? Most people would say that it doesn t and ~hey would
acknowledge that there should be some sort of legal ~nd eth~cal f~ame
work to deal with this delicate balance [ ...] [A]s most )ournahst~ wlll tell
you, the principles that uphold freedom of expres~i~n in inter~~tlOna~ law
are laid out in the International Covenant on ClVll and pohttcal Rlghts
and the European Convention on Human Rights. But, an~ as many
conveniently forget, they also recognise that there are dutles and responsibilities that come along at the same time ... [Bota Sot and Ep~ka e
Re] have shown a flagrant contempt for the basic tenets of professlOnal
journalism and the duties and responsibilities th~t are attached to the
right of freedom of expression. Publishers and edltors must understa~d
that they are accountable both morally and in law for wha.t they pubhsh
within the context of the society that they serve. Anarchy lS not free~om
and freedom of speech does not mean a free for all. It must be exerclsed
with care and account must be taken of its consequences.
The scope of this vision of media responsibility has been broa~ened am~d the
particular circumstances in Kosovo. I~ Bosnia and Herzegovllla, and III the
period of regulation in Kosovo untll June 2000, :he focu~. was on ~e
debilitating effect of hate speech on social and polittcal stablllty. Thus~ III
February 2000, shortly after promulgation of the Hate Speech Regulatton,
OSCE Head of Mission Daan Everts stated:
We cannot tolerate hate speech anywhere in society - whether it is o.n t~e
radio, in the classroom, in a newspaper or at a political ra~ly .. Whlch ~s
why the issuing of the regulation on hate speech at t~e beglllnlllg of thlS
month was so important. Most of all, the new regulation sh~uld .work as a
deterrent. I raise this now because while the mechanisms wlll eXlst to pull
the plug on a radio or TV station, the same cannot b~ done to. a
newspaper. We have no plan to have a press law for prlllted med~a;
in fact we are determined not to have such a law. It smacks of censo~shlp.
But if a paper publishes vitriol and bile, which incite hatred a.galllst a
community or group - as some Kosovo papers have done - th~re lS a ~egal
route to take action against them. Anyone can lodge a com~lalllt . It l~ up
to the Court to decide whether the journalist, editor or pubhsher lS gmlty.
. ·1 d 33
And if they are they can be fined or )al e .
As these remarks indicate, the international authorities were initial~y reluctant
to take steps that went beyond sanctioning of hate speech to regulatlOn of other

content as well, to use law to promote a broader notion of media responsibility.
Instead, as reflected in the comments of Daan Everts, hopes were placed on
journalists' self-regulation:
In any.case, we hope that we won't have to use the Hate Speech
RegulatlOn. Instead we want to see self-regulation in Kosovo. Not
self-censorship. But a mature look at what is published or broadcast
and why. This is part of the role of a strong, democratic and independent
media. Which is why we are pleased that all Kosovo's media have got
together to form an Association. A central part of this Association is a
Code of Conduct. Media outlets themselves will now be responsible to
ensure that their professional colleagues and their rivals do not overstep
the mark. 34
Howe~er,

later, following the events surrounding the death ofPetar Topoljski,
a Serblan UNMIK employee, in spring 2000, the SRSG's steps signalled a
shift toward a more aggressive approach, abandoning media self-regulation and
grounded in a public safety rationale. 35 As crafted in the context oflawlessness
in Kosovo, this approach can be summarized to say: journalists have a
responsibility, where a democratic state is not fully functioning and where
violence is a regular means by which differences are resolved, not to infringe the
physical rights of individuals or to increase social tension; where those duties
are violated, the authority has the right to discipline.
There is the interesting suggestion, here, that greater leeway is permitted to
the TMC because it is not only 'law' in the traditional sense, but Codes of
Conduct in the self-regulatory sense, that are at issue. If the TMC were acting
as a self-generated watchdog of the press, with its powers arising from ethical
rules established by the press, then the restrictions, possibly, could be greater
than if they originated from the State (or, here, its international equivalent).
But, in fact, though the TMC may consider itself the substitute code-carrier
incarnate, it is so only because of the origins of power in government.
The shift from hate speech to public safety as the core underlying public
interest rationale is also significant. It shows that the normative base in the
module can be flexible, lending itself to transfer to different post-conflict
situations. The public safety rationale is grounded in the nature of the postconflict setting in Kosovo, in which the UN administration faced a vacuum in
civil institution infrastructure, most significantly in judicial institutions, and a
chaotic situation marked by widespread violence and considerable potential for
..
. was concluded, strong measures were
pro Ionged,on-golllg
VlO Ience. 36 T h us, it
viewed as necessary for protection of individuals from violence due to the
absence of domestic legal authority and the existence of, or potential for,
widespread lawlessness. 37
Because of this shift from hate speech to public safety, the normative base in
Kosovo extends beyond requirements imposed on domestic legal regimes in
states party to instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination. 38 ,39,40 In other words, they go beyond the type of
action that is required of states under international law, and rely on the type of
action that is permissible under international law force.
.
The sum result of this dialectic, this effort to balance rights of free expreSSIOn
. ,
and countervailing rights, is that the scope of the normative base in Kosovo .1S
quite narrow. In the end, the vision of media responsibility articulated m
Kosovo gives wide latitude to news reporting and commentary that does .not
violate the public interest goals of protecting individuals an? grouFs agamst
incitement to violence and expressions of hatred. Thus, the 1ssues m Kosovo
are not those that typically give rise to the greatest concern among proponents
of journalistic freedoms: the normative base does not equate pro:ection of t~e
public interest with protection of state interests, or ~ith protectl~n of. publ~c
figures or institutions from critical commentary or :v~th suppr~ssmg d1sse~1nation of facts unfavourable to the governing authontles. In th1S regard, wh1le
the normative base does proscribe the dissemination of material which journalists 'know or ought to know to be false or deceptive', it does not (in contrast to
many domestic legal system~) dictate ~ore st~ing:~t penalties -",h.en the
material is injurious to part1cular pubhc offic1als. Nor d~es 1t l?clude
proscriptions against content found to be insulting to pubhc .affic1als or
42
governmental entities. Instead, the primary goal ~f the n~rmat1ve base,. at
least as applied in Kosovo thus far, has been to estabhsh the kmd of pr~tectlon
against incitement to violence found permissible in many domest1c legal
systems and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, as well
as the hate speech proscriptions found in international instruments. 43

Implementation of the Module: Process and Accountability
It is a truism that the test of a legal system's compliance with fundamental
norms as well as fairness and effectiveness, lies in the actual application and
enforc~ment of its laws. This is certainly the case with the module as well.
Among the recurring themes in the studies appearing in this volume is not only
the need to define substantive standards, but also the structural and procedural
requirements satisfactory to establish legitimacy for information intervention.
Of these, one of the most pressing is that of institutional and procedural
safeguards against improper interference with the exercise of expressive
activity.
In a complex context, most of the individuals endowed with these powers of
regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have acted, g~nerally,
responsibly and have deliberately sought to maintain the balance mherent
in the system of information intervention. At the same time, however, it must
be recognized that the structure itself, if adopted in future situations, could
lend itself to potential abuses. These are new phenomena - it is only very
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recently that international actors have begun to by-pass domestic legal regimes
as the intermediaries of application of international human rights norms in the
field of mass media regulation. 44 And the systems of accountability are also new
and, if review is by the secretary-general or the Security Council of awesome
distance from the locales of post-conflict environments. That is 'a prominent
reason for the existence and activity of 'freedom of speech' NGOs.
How does one review implementation of the module, application of the
normative base and the procedures that have thus far been developed in its
evolution? As before, we are guided by applicable international standards and
. . I
I
45
.
generaI pnnClp es of aw. A number of these have rece1ved articulation in
Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights construing that provision.46
To do this, we will focus first on what we have called, bringing together the
existing examples, the office of the Regulator, particularly its prosecutorial
functions. Then, we will turn to questions about the module's control
mechanisms; in particular, looking at issues of competence and degree of
structural independence.

The Office of the Regulator: Public Relations, Investigation,
Prosecution
The multi-dimensional office of the Regulator includes both extra-legal and
law-based functions. In other words, in some cases, it acts to advance certain
policies by means of powers of persuasion, while in others - its more sensitive
role - it acts to investigate and prosecute suspected violations of legal norms.
The result is a combination of a managerial theory of compliance with
traditional criminal law models of forcible enforcement. 47
Within this range of activity, it is possible to delineate several elements of the
performance of duties in this office: informal/public advocacy, investigative,
and prosecutorial elements. Thus, in carrying out its functions, the Regulator
acts as a public advocate for media responsibility, a monitor of mass media
conduct and investigator of complaints, and as a formal prosecutor.

Extra-Legal Functions
In general, the manner in which these functions are carried out can be
attributed to questions of individual personal style; the very human, personal,
direct management of the operation. Models are abstract, impersonal, described, usually, apart from the personnel who implement them. In the case of
Kosovo, for example, the success and operation of the framework has been
affected in important ways by the personal characteristics of the individual
holding the office. 48
The hallmark of the extra-legal activity has been a frank can dour on the part
of the Regulator, a readiness to articulate its motivations and its goals. Thus,
the Regulator has been vocal in providing expressions of concern and pleas for
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voluntary compliance with accepted journalistic ethics. The style is open,
cajoling, and clearly conscious of the public effect of the TMC's pronouncements. At times, these statements to the journalistic community and the public
at large have taken on the character of general observations, perhaps warning
about legal violations but without identifying specific offenders. For example,
in a 20 February, 2001 news release about its sanctioning decision against the
newspaper Epoka eRe, the TMC stated:

If it were indeed the case that Bota Sot did manipulate the images they
obtained from Reuters, this would constitute gross professional misconduct. Furthermore, their attempts to portray all the other media who
carried these images, as being misleading would be a further example of
deliberate distortion in the face of the overwhelming evidence. It is the
duty of editors to report the facts as accurately as possible and to
distinguish opinion from fact. This is particularly important when
tensions are high and the subject matter is so sensitive. To alter the
available evidence to support an opinion and pass it off as news is
unconscionable and discredits the profession of journalism. 50
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The TMC remains deeply concerned about the current levels of inflammatory and potentially dangerous accusation and counter accusation
in the Kosovo written press [... JMuch of the press in Pristina serves up
a daily diet of denouncement and insult. As a consequence the TMC
considers that the flavour and tenor of the press at present contributes to
. 49
t he preval'1'mg atmosphere 0 f tenSIOn.
Or, on other occasions, the TMC addressed concerns about individual news
organs to the public and journalistic community with regard to conduct that,
while considered irresponsible, was lacking in a legal basis to proceed to
prosecution. An example is a TMC 26 March, 2001 news release, entitled
'Altering Photographs', which we reproduce here in full:
Last Friday the 23rd March 2001 all of the major newspapers in Kosovo
carried the story of Thursday's tragic shootings at a Macedonian military
checkpoint in Tetovo. These stories were all accompanied by photographs, most of which originated from the Reuters News Agency. With
the exception of Bota Sot all these newspapers showed a black object on
the ground close to the body of one of those who was killed. Indeed there
has been considerable debate as to precisely what this object was.
The Office of the TMC understands that the circumstances surrounding this incident have caused considerable controversy. In this respect it
is not the intention of the Office to comment on these circumstances or on
the editorial line taken by any of the newspapers in their Friday editions.
However, what is extremely alarming is the apparent removal, by Bota
Sot, of a crucial piece of evidence from a photograph taken from an
international source.
The Office of the TMC is currently in discussions with the Senior
Legal Council of the Reuters News Agency to determine conclusively
whether or not Bota Sot altered the original Reuters image to suit the
thesis of their article. We have also consulted with them on how they may
wish to proceed. Additionally, we are also corresponding with other
international news and press agencies, including CNN and AP TN, and
have discussed with them their footage and reports of the incident. All
have confirmed the presence of the object in their respective photographic or video sequences and from the eye witness accounts of their
journalists.
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In looking to future applications of the module, we note that the above
examples present a fine line between the Regulator's legitimate use of powers
of public persuasion and the exercise of a chilling effect on the exercise of rights
of expression. The reason for this, of course, is that the Regulator's public
statements are always backed by its power to influence media conduct by means
of the threat inherent in its authority to prosecute. It will take strict adherence
to the normative base, limiting such use of public relations to content falling
clearly within its confines, to keep the Regulator from crossing the line into
exerting a 'chilling effect' on protected news reporting and commentary.

Legal: the Authority to Investigate and Prosecute
The legal power of the Regulator lies here: in the authority to investigate
suspected violations, to assess whether a violation has indeed occurred, and to
proceed with the prosecution process, which can culminate in the imposition of
sanctions. It is here where the most sensitive concerns about abuse of authority
can be found.
The Regulator's investigative activity serves multiple purposes: it provides
the regulatory authority with information with which to establish guilt, as well
as to identify ameliorating or exacerbating circumstances for the purposes of
crafting remedies and/or penalties. Thus, in the Epoka e Re newspaper case,
TMC Simon Haselock made an unannounced visit to the newspaper's offices
(following an unsuccessful attempt to elicit information by mail from the
newspaper), and in the Bota Sot case he engaged in extensive correspondence
with the newspaper's editors. 51 ,52
These activities present both positive and potentially negative aspects. They
demonstrate a human touch, an opportunity for negotiation and mediation. On
the other hand, they pose the spectre of the sort of arbitrary harassment that
authorities in many countries have employed to threaten the mass media if their
content is considered offensive. To guard against this risk, a crucial element
will be the existence of effective independent review of the Regulator's actions.
As we will discuss below, this is a weak link in the TMC system.
Another dimension of the investigative mode provides the Regulator with the
opportunity to construe and apply legal norms in deciding whether or not to
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proceed with formal prosecution. An example is the TMC's 25 April, 2001
letter to Mr Xhavit Haliti, demonstrating the TMC's will.ingness to constr~~
international human rights norms in applying the normatIve base mandate.
Mr Haliti a leading figure in the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK), had
asked the TMC to investigate the possibility of charges against the newspap~r
Bota Sot. 54 We quote an excerpt from his letter at length because of what It
reveals regarding the TMC's investigative and prosecutorial style:

norms generated by the legislature and not the executive branch. This means
operating pursuant to generally applicable, published normative base. One
measuring stick is to ascertain whether the norms in question have sufficient
precision and clarity to satisfy the 'prescribed by law' requirement in Article
10(2) of the ECHR. 57
As implemented in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the module, with
its published normative base, appears to satisfy these standards. For example,
in those cases in Kosovo in which prosecution has been invoked, these
conditions appear to have been satisfied. In this regard, it should be noted
that despite his evident opposition to Bota Sot's alleged unprofessional conduct
expressed in the 'Altering Photos' news release, TMC Simon Haselock did not
pursue legal action against the newspaper. 58
This contrasts with the action of the SRSG in June 2000, when it closed the
office of the newspaper Dita for eight days on the grounds that Dita and its
editors 'had violated the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 1244
(1999),.59 The SRSG's action was taken in response to the events of spring
2000, when Dita identified Topoljski, as mentioned, a Serbian UNMIK
employee, as a war criminal and provided both a photo of Mr Topoljski
and details of his name, address and workplace information. Topoljski was
found murdered on 16 May, and on 19 May, the editor of Dita published an
open letter to the SRSG, indicating that the newspaper would continue to
publish the names of individuals 'involved against Albanians'. It is doubtful
that SC Resolution 1244, which does not refer to expressive activity in any way
and is not directed toward private actors, contains any language that would
support the conclusion that closure of a newspaper for publication of detailed
information about an individual, even if done so in order to advocate violence
against that person, would satisfy the 'prescribed by law' standard. 6o
Other general principles relevant to the module relate to the process itself:
an accused's right to be heard, equality before the law, and opportunity for
appea1. 61 The TMC's mandate in Regulation 2000/37 provides little direction
on the procedures to be followed by the TMC in determining the existence of a
violation and imposing sanctions. 62 However, the structure and process of
prosecution have evolved quickly into a more formal set of legal rules and
safeguards. In this regard, the important step was the MAB's decision in the
Dita case, in which the MAB overturned the TMC's decision to impose
sanctions on the newspaper because of procedural infirmities: violations of
international norms and the law in effect in Kosovo in 1989. 63 In response to
that decision, the TMC adopted measures to provide greater procedural
safeguards for accused. 64 According to the Media Hearings Board Rules of
Procedure, if the TMC concludes that a violation has occurred and that
prosecution is warranted, the formal process must begin with the TMC's
presentation of written notice (which we will call an 'Accusation'), which must
inform the alleged violator of an opportunity to reply.65 The indictment must
then be presented to the MHB, which determines whether a violation has
occurred and, in addition, recommends to the TMC whether there are any
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I have written to Bota Sot concerning your complaints and have
discussed your concerns with them at length. Unfortunately, given
the very specific nature of the Regulation I have to tell you that I do
not consider that I can proceed on this matter any further. To be sure of a
successful action under the Regulation all the various criteria that it
stipulates must be satisfied and this is not possible in the articles to which
you refer. Nevertheless, I must say that I consider these a~ticles to have
been deliberately sensational, unsubstantiated and provocatIve and I have
made these and other points forcefully to the Editor and will continue to
do so.
I also note from your letter that you understand the principle that as a
public figure you will often be exposed to criticism and allegations. T?is
is the one of the negative aspects of public political debate. In applYIng
the conditions of the European Convention on Human Rights in regard
to freedom of expression you will be aware that the European Court has
taken the view that public figures are not entitled to the same measure of
protection in cases of defamation than [sic] are private citizen.s. This is
another reason why I believe that a case taken up on the basIs of your
complaints would not stand scrutiny by the Media Appeals Board.
This example serves as an illustration of TMC's efforts to operate within .the
constraints oflaw, including the fundamental norms in the UNMIK constitutional structure.

Formal Prosecution
In Kosovo, the prosecutorial energies of the TMC have been focused o~ cases
involving suspected incitement of violence against individuals. At .tIme ?f
writing, the TMC has invoked the formal sanctioning process three tImes, In
actions against three different newspapers. 55 In each case, the charge was the
same: violation of Section 4.1 of Regulation 2000/37.
The Regulator is empowered to prosecute suspected violations of ~he
normative base , which is rendered enforceable
by means
.
' of .a range of remedIes,
.
56
including financial penalties and suspensIOn or termInatIOn of operatIOns.
The exercise of these powers implicates a number of general principles of law.
First, according to those principles, the laws and process must be transparent
and 'lawful' - that is, based on existing, published, generally applicable legal
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mitigating or aggravating circumstances that should be taken into account when
the TMC decides upon the appropriate remedies and/or penalties. 66 The TMC
is not permitted to impose sanctions without a finding by the MHB that the
media outlet or representative in question has violated one or more rules in the
normative base. 67
At the MHB hearing, both the TMC and the respondent, who may be
represented by an attorney, are allowed to address the Board for no more than
forty minutes, and each member of the Board may question the parties for up to
thirty minutes. The Board may invite for oral presentation third-party witnesses and experts; the Rules of Procedure do not provide the parties a right to
question those persons. 68 The burden of proof upon all such issues is upon the
TMC. 69 The TMC's decision as to penalties may be appealed to the Media
Appeals Board. 7o The MAB is empowered to uphold, modify, or rescind the
TMC's sanctioning decision.
Throughout, questions of accountability and independence loom over this
process. Is there sufficient sharing and diffusion of power to guard adequately
against abuses by the authorities? Is the Regulator sufficiently independent
from the legislator/executive SRSG? Is the Regulator accountable only to the
law? By what mechanisms are the Regulator's acts reviewed to determine their
compliance with these principles?
Here, again, certain general principles (sensitive to the special needs of a
post-conflict context) should apply. For example, a prosecutor is bound by law,
and only the law (here, this means the fundamental norms in the UNMIK
Constitution, as well as the normative base); a prosecutor must be independent
from legislative and executive branch control; and, to insure observance of
these standards, a prosecutor's act must be subject to review by an independent
agency.71 The last point is perhaps the key to the entire system of administrative justice. In effect, it provides that there must - again subject to the
possibly special circumstances of conflict zones - be a supervisory system of
control sufficiently independent to make an objective determination as to
whether the administrator has acted in compliance not only with other
principles of administrative justice, but with all applicable legal norms as well.
While clearly an effort to assure procedural fairness, the module's structure
and procedures raise certain questions from the point of view of compatibility
with these principles. First, there is the question of the TMC's independence
from the SRSG, which is both the UNMIK legislature and executive.
According to the TMC's organic statute, the TMC has independent status
and is temporary pending the establishment of effective domestic parallel
structures. 72 The meaning of 'independence' in this context is not explained.
The individual TMC is named by the SRSG; however, the SRSG is not
involved in the day-to-day functions of the TMC, nor is there evidence that the
SRSG has exerted any direct influence on the TMC's actions. 73
Second, and perhaps more problematic, are a series of questions related to
the roles of the TMC, the MHB, and the MAB. The MHB is analogous to a
trial court, with the judge or jury making the ultimate determination of guilt or

innocence. However, this MHB decision is insulated from review. In addi(
if a violation is found, it is the Regulator (the TMC) who decides on the na::;~
of the penalties - definitely a judicial or jury function that should be outside the
Regu~ator's powers. ~y possessing the ability to decide upon and impose
sanctIOns, the TMC IS both prosecutor and judge.
Next, the question must be asked, although it is very difficult to answer
w~et~er the MHB and MAB are sufficiently independent to satisfy general
pnncIples and the UNMIK Constitution. In the context of ECHR Article 6.1,
the ECtHR has construed 'independent' as independence from the legislative
and executive branches, as well as the parties. 74 The European Court's determinations as to the independence of control bodies is very fact-intensive and
given the scope of our inquiry, we can simply cite the factors listed by the Court;
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In order to determine whether a body can be considered to be 'independent' of the executive it is necessary to have regard to the manner of
appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office the
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the que~tion
whether the body presents an appearance of independence?5
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are three significant areas in which
the Kosovo MAB lacks competence: (1) review of the Regulator's investigative
acts; (2) review of the MHB's decisions as to guilt or innocence; and (3) review
of the SRSG's legislative acts. 76 ,77,78 As to the last of these, this means that
the MAB's competence also does not extend to a power of review over the
normative base itself, to determine if its provisions comport with the fundamental norms of the UNMIK Constitution.
In sum, significant steps in the evolution of the module have been taken to
insure adequate safeguards for the mass media. However, particularly before
the module is again employed in a post-conflict situation, attention should be
devoted to further analysis and structural and procedural revisions. These
matters go directly to fundamental issues about the module's legitimacy.

The Quest for Legitimacy
The emerging system of information intervention, reflected in the module,
rests on a thin veneer of acceptance within the global community at large: the
assumption, by the UN Security Council and secretary-general, that regulation
of m~dia content is both acceptable and integral to democracy building in postconflIct societies, and that it is possible to conduct it in a way that is compatible
with international free speech and free press standards. 79
The initial emergence of the module met with intense criticism from free
8o
press advocates. The significance of this lies in the reminder to the United
Nations and other international organizations that this system of governance at
bottom is reliant upon a public legitimacy, difficult to obtain or sustain in light
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of the perceived threat to news media freedoms. From a slightly different
perspective, the concerns about legitimacy might also stem from a democratic
deficit in international institutions.
To address these concerns, it is necessary to have safeguards against heavyhandedness, or even the appearance of such heavy-handedness, by assuring
procedural fairness and objectivity. In this regard, in addition to noting the
binding fundamental norms in the UNMIK Constitution, much of our
discussion has been grounded in an assumption that certain general principles
apply here as a matter oflaw. But even if they might not as a matter oflaw, they
should be followed as a matter of policy, for the sake of establishing and
maintaining legitimacy.
Even more generally, the human rights rationale for what might be called
'aggressive peacemaking' and the intrusiveness into the zone of freedom of
expression is a precarious one. To achieve legitimacy, processes of information
intervention need popular support from the very people and institutions from
whom it faces determined opposition - media NGOs, especially free speech and
free press advocates. A critical sticking point for these NGOs is the question of
whether circumstances ever can exist to justify a rearticulation and reframing of
widely accepted standards of free speech/free press. How norms are developed,
their very entry and maturation, will have an influence on how they are received
by these significant groups. The UN must find ways of engaging those who
'vote' on the question of legitimacy.
The development and presentation of free speech norms in the information
intervention context is important for another reason. Peacekeeping operations
are partly designed to provide a context sufficiently altered and enhanced that a
more democratic society can flourish after the operation has been dissolved.
Construction of a public sphere that supports a democratic society is an element
of that process. When an international governmental organization engages in
regulation of the press, its actions may affect the nature of the political system
that follows. How a regulatory rule is shaped, how it is presented in the society,
how those who will be subject to a seemingly censorial rule react and accept that
rule - all these are part of the difficult process of democracy development in a
conflict zone. 81

post-conflict circumstances in Kosovo. Because they directly affect the exercise
of free expression guaranteed in international human rights instruments, and
because some of the normative base exceeds what is required of states to
regulate hate speech under international norms, an over-riding question
becomes whether the restrictions on media content are permissible interferences with media freedoms.
These have always been complex issues in domestic legal systems. The
emergence of the module now presents a new dimension for the study of these
long-standing issues in the sphere of mass media law.

Conclusion
The module is a work in progress, based on exigencies, which dictated not only
its form and substance, but indeed its very rationale for existence. The postconflict intervention functions within the existing organizational structure of
the United Nations and is intended to be a temporary system designed to
respond to an environment of lawlessness and violence and the absence of
effective domestic legal institutions.
Two interlocking themes form the framework for understanding this
normative base: the pervasive nature of human rights law, and the specific
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Notes
1. This phrase is borrowed from Thompson and De Luce's contribution to this
volume: Chapter 7: 'Escalating to Success? The Intervention in Bosnia and
Hercegovina'.
2. Contributions to this volume emphasize the distinctions between pre-,
peacekeeping (,Phase One') and post-peacekeeping (,Phase Two') forms of information intervention.
3. Thompson and De Luce. Chapter 7.
4. The Office of the High Representative established the IMC on 11 June 1998,
following the Conclusions of the 1997 Bonn Peace Implementation Conference
that called for establishment of a temporary agency to monitor and supervize the
mass media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Decision of the High Representative,
'Decision on the Establishment [sic] of the Independent Media Commission',
Sarajevo, 11 June 1998, Online Uune 2001] available at hup://www.OHR.INT/
mediares/d98061la. Pech, 'Is Dayton Falling?' p. 4. In March 2001 the IMC was
merged with the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency to form a new entity, the
Communication Regulatory Agency (CRA). The head of this new entity is the
Chief Executive Officer. The module discussed in this chapter is based on the
IMC before the merger. See OHR, 'Decision Combining the Competencies of the
Independent Media Commission and the Telecommunications Agency' of 2
March 2001. Online [October 2001], available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/
mediadec/default.asp?contentjd = 75.
5. The TMC was created pursuant to regulations promulgated on 17 June 2000 by the
Special Representative of the UN secretary-general in Kosovo: Regulation No.
2000/36, 'On the Licensing and Regulation of the Broadcast Media in Kosovo',
Online Uuly 2001] available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/
reg036.html and Regulation No. 2000/37, 'On the Conduct of the Print Media in
Kosovo', Online Uuly 2001] available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/
regulations/reg037.html See Palmer, 'A Very Clear and Present Danger', p. 179.
6. In March 2001, a new entity, the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA), was
established in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a step in the transition toward local rule.
The CRA's mandate includes assumption of the IMC's responsibilities. See the
OHR, 'Decision Combining the Competencies of the Independent Media Commission and the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency', 2 March 2001. In
Kosovo, it can be expected that significant changes in the module will be
forthcoming as a result of the 'Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment' signed into law by the SRSG on 15 May 2001 (UNMIK/REG/2001/
9), Online Uuly 2001] available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regO 1.09 .html. Sections 5.4(b) and 11.1 call for the establishment of a new
media regulatory body, to be entitled the 'Independent Media Commission'. For
the purposes of our contribution, we limit our description and analysis to the office
of the Temporary Media Commissioner as of 15 May, 2001.
7. See, e.g., Hansjorg Strohmeyer's recent proposal for 'quick-start packages' of
existing structural and substantive law models for UN-administered territories, in
Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction', p. 62.
8. Matheson, 'United Nations Governance', p. 76; Wilde, 'From Bosnia to Kosovo',
p.467.
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9. The module's normative base is a substitution of international law for a domestic
legal regime. However, in contrast to traditional international regulatory systems,
the subjects of regulation are not states, but private natural and legal persons. As
Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter put it, this idea of the supranational ~
fulfilled by the emerging module ~ 'represents another departure from the bedrock
assumption of traditional public international law: that states, functioning as
unitary entities, are the only subjects of international rules and institutions and
hence the only recognized actors in the international realm'. Helfer and Slaughter,
'Toward a Theory', p. 288.
10. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999), Online Uune 2001],
available at http://www.un.int/usa/sresI244.htm
11. The organic acts for the TMC are UNMIK Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37; and
the IMC's organic instrument is the 'Regulation for the Independent Media
Commission (IMC)', adopted by the IMC on 16 September 1998 (amended 8
September 1999, and 21 October 1999), Online Uuly 2001], available at http:;/
www.imcbih.org/Download/DLRegulations/DLReg/dlreg~2

12. The secretary-general's periodic status reports to the Security Council concerning
Kosovo include information on 'media affairs', available at the UNMIK website,
http://www .un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo l.shtml
13. UNMIK/REG/1999/1, 25 July 1999, Online Uune 2001] available at http:;/
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regl
14. Article 10 ('Freedom of Expression') states in full:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Among the many secondary sources on the extensive Article 10 jurisprudence of
the ECtHR, see: Harris et a!., Law o/the European Convention, pp. 372-416; Van
Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice, pp. 557~85; Krug and Swann, Supplement to ABA-CEELI
15. For the European Court of Human Rights' Judgements, see http://www.echr.coe.int
16. See, e.g., decisions of the Media Appeals Board in the cases of: Belul Beqaj and
the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE,
Respondent (16 September 2000), paras 68~75, Online Uuly 2001], available at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/indbodies/tmc/cases/dita.php3 and Sylejman Aliu and
the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE,
Respondent (19 February 2001), paras 71~5 (copy on file with the authors).
17. Reinisch, International Organizations, pp. 318~22.
18. In referring to the SRSG, we incorporate those consultative institutions that
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function within its Joint Interim Administrative Structure alAS), such as the
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTS) and Interim Administrative Council (lAC).
19. UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 ('On the Authority of the Interim Administration in
Kosovo'), 25 July 1999, Section 1.1, states in full: 'All legislative and executive
authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is
vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral.'
20. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar powers were conferred on the director-general.
21. A similar list for broadcasters, but adding suspension or termination of broadcast
licenses, is found in UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 3.1.
22. 'Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure' (adopted 7 November 2000) Sections
17-18. Online on the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Web site, http://www.osce.org/
kosovo. The three members (two local, one international) of the MHB are
appointed by the TMC, based on nominations from three organizations: the
Association of Kosovo Journalists (AKJ), the Kosovo Law Center, and the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (information in e-mail
message from TMC Simon Haselock to the authors, 12 March 2001).
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a seven-member Enforcement Panel decides cases
regarding the director-general's imposition of penalties, according to the Section
16.1 of the 'IMC Procedure for Handling Cases' (adopted 8 December 1998, and
amended 9 June 1999, and 21 October 1999), Online Uuly 2001], available at
http://www.imcbih.org/Download/DLRegulations/DLReg/dlreg_3.html The decision as to the penalty is also made by the Enforcement Panel. In Kosovo, this is
made by the TMC alone. The Regulator in the Bosnia and Herzegovina system
(the director-general) also serves as chair of the Enforcement Panel ('IMC
Procedure for Handling Cases', Sections 13.1 and 15). Demonstrating somewhat
greater sensitivity to separation of powers issues, the TMC in Kosovo is not a
member of the MHB. In its 7 November 2000 news release announcing the
issuance of the MHB Rules of Procedure and formation of the MHB, the TMC
stated that the MHB would be an 'independent administrative panel'. Online
Uune 2001], available, http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?newsjd= 1243
In its 19 February 2001 Bota Sot decision, para 69, the Media Appeals Board
repeated this statement.
23. On 31 August 2000, the MAB adopted and issued two sets of procedural rules:
'Rules of Procedure (Conduct of Hearings)' 001/2000, 31 August 2000. See OSCE
Mission in Kosovo web site, http://www.osce.org/kosovoand 'Rules of Procedure
(Filing of Appeals), Online Uune 2001], available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/
indbodies/mab. php3
24. UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 4.5; UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, Section
3.1. The MAB's three members (two international and one local) are appointed by
the SRSG upon nomination by the Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Institution Building (UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section
4.4). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the IMC Council, the IMC's regulatory body,
hears appeals from decisions of the director-general and Enforcement Panel ('IMC
Procedure for Handling Cases' Sections 11.7, 16.5, and 23.1).
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 15.1; ECHR,
Article 7.1. In the area of freedom of expression, this principle is expressed in the
requirement in Article 10.2, ECHR, that any interference with the exercise of
freedom of expression must be 'prescribed by law'.
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26. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, Section 1.1 ('Applicable Law'), states in full:
The law applicable in Kosovo shall be:
a. The regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder; and
b. The law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989. In case of a conflict the
regulations and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder shall take 'precedence.
The date 22 March 1989 is the date on which the Republic Serbia Assembly
formally terminated most elements of Kosovo's autonomous status. As of June
2001, the TMC's publications and enforcement actions have never referred to
any provisions from the legal base identified in Section l.l(b).
27. See 'Temporary Code of Conduct for the Print Media in Kosovo' and the 'Code of
Conduct for the Broadcast Media in Kosovo'. The codes were promulgated
pursuant to SRSG Administrative Direction 2000/20 [UNMIK/DIR/2000/20]
of 18 September 2000. The documents are online at the OSLE web site: http://
www.osce.org/kosovo
28. Regulation 2000/37, Section 4.1; Code of Conduct Section 2.1. See, for example,
the United States Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969).
29. These international conventions include: the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.
30. Reflecting perhaps the challenging conditions in which such drafting takes place,
certain provisions in the normative base are suspect on technical drafting grounds,
perhaps under the 'prescribed by law' test of Article 10.2, ECHR. For example,
Section 4.1 says nothing about the State of mind of the publisher (in contrast to the
Brandenburg test's 'directed toward .. .'). In Section 2.1, the term 'other violence'
is quite vague.
31. See, for example, the speech by Ambassador Daan Everts, OSCE Head of
Mission, on the occasion of the opening of the new studios of Radio Television
Kosovo (RTK), 16 February 2000. Online at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo web
site: http://www.osce.org/kosovo In response to critics of the Hate Speech
Regulation, he comments:
This new regulation has provoked strong reactions and some allegations that it is
targeting the media specifically. This is not the case! The new regulation is
absolutely in line with international covenants on freedom of speech and
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Advisory Council of Legislative Matters, the Council of Europe and the UN.
See also Section 1.1 of Regulation 2000/37, which states in full:
The Temporary Media Commissioner, in special circumstances, may issue
temporary Codes of Conduct. Before issuing any such code, the Temporary
Media Commissioner shall consult with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, and interested, media-related parties as appropriate.
It is also possible that the SRSG vetted the proposed norms with consultative
bodies such as the lAC and KTS.
32. Copy on file with the authors.
33. Everts, Speech on the occasion of the opening of the new RTK studios, 16
February 2000.
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34. Ibid.
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one important consequence of this particular form of intervention is the elision of
distinctions between the authority's treatment of broadcast media and its treatment of print media. It is true that licensing existed only for broadcasters, but, as it
turned out the burden of concern about violations that might upset the public,
order dealt' with violations by the press. The authority to close down newspapers
was actually used with newspapers, though not with radio and television st~tions.
36. Ibid. and Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction', pp. 48-50, 58-60. It IS also
important to note that much of the concern about violence stemmed from content
in Kosovar publications that identified individual Kosovars, not members of other
ethnic groups. For example, this was the case in the three formal prosecutions
brought by the TMC.
37. TMC's Simon Haselock has been a vocal proponent of this view. In his 20
February 2001 sanctioning decision in Epoka eRe, for example, he stated:
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democracy. I went on to describe that violence remained a regular means by
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was self-evident across the whole spectrum of society ... [M]y main function in
these cases is to uphold the rights of the individual against the threat of violence
and increased tension caused by this irresponsibility. 'Sanctioning Decision on
Epoka eRe', para. 8 Online at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo web site: http://
www.osce.orgjkosovo).
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).
Article III(c) states that '[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide' is one'
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39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976). Article 20.2 requires
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constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence'.
40. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966). Article 4(a) requires parties to 'declare an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any
race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin'.
41. 'Temporary Code of Conduct for the Print Media in Kosovo', Section 6.1. We do
not wish to suggest that the normative base is free of problems. For example, we
note that dissemination of 'false or deceptive' material in Section 6.1 is enforceable
even without any need for the TMC to demonstrate that it was injurious to an
individual. This is a significant departure from traditional notions of defamation
law in domestic legal systems, which could potentially be applied to infringe
seriously the exercise of expression.
42. The absence of such provisions demonstrates the influence of the Lingens v.
Austria, (1986) 8 EHRR 407, line of decisions by the ECtHR, in which the Court
has ruled on numerous occasions that in public political debate, public officials are
not entitled to the same measure of legal protection as are private citizens. See
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Harris.~t ai, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 397-401; and
van DIJk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice, p. 572.
43. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447, in which the United States
Supreme Court stated that:
[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a Stat t
fi b'd
.
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or 1 or proSCrIbe advocacy of the use of force or oflaw violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.
Improvements to the normative base certainly can be made: while Section 2.1 of
the print media Code of Conduct clearly seeks to replicate aspects of the
Bran~enburg v. Ohio rule, it does not include the element that the advocacy in
questIOn has been 'directed to' inciting or producing lawless action. This absence
could expose speakers to prosecution under Section 2.1 even where they did not
intend to 'produce' an actionable harm.
44. The international community since 1945 has been creating norms; what is new
here is that it is international agencies that are applying these norms.
45. See, e.g., Council of Europe, The Administration and You; Amerasinghe, 'The
Future ofInternational Administrative Law, p. 773; Price and Krug, The Enabling
EnVironment for Free and Independent Media.
46. A~ti~le 6.1 states 'I~ tiJe determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
crImmal charge agamst him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' A recent
ECtHR judgement construing and applying this provision is Lauko v. Slovakia
(unreported,2 September 1998), paras. 56-8. In our opinion, there is little doubt that
the module's prosecutorial process presents a determination of a person's 'civil rights
and obligations' or of 'criminal charges against him' and therefore implicates Article
6.1. For one thing, it is likely that these proceedings would be viewed as 'criminal' in
nature for purposes of Article 6.1. Here, of particular note are the facts that the SRSG
Regulations are generally applicable and that the TMC identifies the purposes of its
monetary sanctions as 'punitive' and 'deterrent' - factors that the ECtHR has found
detenninative in concluding that Article 6.1 is implicated. Even if the TMC
p.roceedings are not criminal in nature, it is likely that they would satisfy the 'civil
rIghts and obligations' standard in Article 6.1. In its case law, the ECtHR has ruled
tha~ administrative proceedings that may result in a negative impact on a person's
busmess, property, or conduct of a profession will implicate Article 6.1. See Harris et
aI., Law of the European Convention pp. 174--95.
Meanwhile, it is important to note as well that the MAE itself has concluded that it
is bound to observe the standards of Article 6.1. See the MAE's decision in Belul Beqaj
and the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner OSCE
Respondent, paras 62-7.
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47. See Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, pp. 22-8. See also Helfer and
Slaughter, 'Toward a Theory', p. 287.
48. Much of the tone can be attributed to the approach of Simon Haselock, who had
been an architect of information intervention in Bosnia Herzegovina and then
became Temporary Media Commissioner in Kosovo in August 2000.
49. TMC, 'Sanctioning Decision on Epoka eRe', para. 8.
50. Office of Media Appeals Board, 'Altering Photographs'. Online at the OSCE
Mission in Kosovo website: http://www.osce.org/kosovo
51. TMC, 'Sanctioning Decision on Epoka eRe', para. lO(a).
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52. MAB decision in Sylejman Aliu and the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and
Temporary Media Commission, OSCE, Respondent, paras 11-16.
53. Copy on file with the authors.
54. Regarding party affiliation, see: 'President, Kosovo Party Leader Discuss Macedonia Border Situation', BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 March 2001; and
David Holley, 'Yugoslavia Power Changes Hands', Los Angeles Times, 7 October
2000.
55. The first case was the TMC's 20 July 2000 sanctioning decision against the
newspaper Dita and its publisher, Belul Beqaj, in which a fine ofDEM 25,000 was
imposed. This decision was appealed to the MAB, which reversed the TMC's
decision on procedural grounds: Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and
Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent. The second case involved the
TMC's sanctioning decision of 1 December 2000 (following an MHB decision
dated 13 November 2000) against the newspaper Bota Sot and its publisher,
Sylejman Aliu, in which a fine of DEM 50,000 was imposed. This decision was
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action: Sylejman Aliu and the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and Temporary Media
Commission, OSCE, Respondent. The third case was the TMC's 20 February 2000
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Epoka eRe. Sanctioning Decision on Epoke eRe. Online at the OSCE Mission in
Kosovo website:http://www.osce.org/kosovo. To our knowledge, that decision was
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Each of the cases has had a different procedural history. In Dita, there was no
MHB decision. In Bota Sot, there was both an MHB decision and an MAB
decision. In Epoka eRe, there was an MHB decision, but apparently not an MAB
decision.
56. See, for example, Section 2.1 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, which authorizes
the TMC to impose one or more of the following sanctions: a warning; the
requirement to publish a reply, correction or apology; a fine of not less than DM
1,000 and not exceeding DM 100,000; seizure of equipment and/or printed
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57. For recent discussion, see the ECtHR decision in Tammer v. Estonia [Application
no. 41205/98; Judgement of 6 February 2001], paras 35-8.
58. 'Sanctioning Decision on Epoka eRe' (Note 58).
59. Special Representative Executive Decision No. 2000/2 (UNMIK/ED/2000/2, 30
May 2000), cited in the MAB decision in Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper Dita,
Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent, para. 21.
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61. The equality before the law standard requires that in addition to the right to be
heard, that the defendant be placed on an equal footing with the accuser in the
process. See Council of Europe, The Administration and You, pp. 14-16.
62. MAB decision in Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper Dita, Appellant and Temporary
Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent, para. 65.
63. Ibid., para. 89.
64. Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure (Note 24). In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
of particular importance for procedural considerations is the IMC document
entitled 'Procedure for Handling Cases' (adopted 8 December 1998, and amended
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9 June 1999 and 21 October 1999), Online Uune 2001], available at http://
www.imcbih.org/Download/DLRegulations/DLReg/dlreg_3.htmI
SRSG Reg. 2000/37, Section 2.3.
Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure, Section 15 (Note 24).
Ibid., Sections 17 (,Absent fraud or intentional malfeasance, the decision of the
Board is deemed final and not subject to appeal. Both the TMC and the
respondent are bound to the decision.') and 18 ('In [the] event that the ruling
favors the respondent, the respondent shall be protected against double-jeopardy,
and the TMC shall drop all related complaints stemming from the original
complaint. ').
Ibid., Sections 6, 8, and 11-12.
Ibid., Section 7.

70. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Enforcement Panel will rule on both the questions
of liability and the nature of sanctions if the defendant is guilty. These decisions
may be appealed to the IMC Council. 'Regulation for the Independent Media
Commission (IMC)' (adopted 16 September 1998, amended 8 September and 21
October 1999), Section 16. Available at http://www.imcbih.org
71. Council of Europe, The Administration and You, pp. 37--43.
72. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/36, Section 1.1.
73. Ibid., Section 1.2.
74. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention, p. 231.
75. Judgement in Lauko v. Slovakia, para. 63 (Note 49). See also the discussions of the
Court's Article 6.1. case law on this question in Harris et aI., pp. 231--4; and van
Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice, pp. 451-2.
76. According UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 4.2(c), the MAB's power of
review is limited to sanctioning decisions of the TMC; in other words, acts of the
TMC after the end of the investigation and the MHB hearing. Thus, arbitrary use
of the powers of pre-hearing investigation, such as unreasonable searches, are
insulated from any review. This is because the MHB is also not competent to rule
on these questions, but is limited to deciding the question of the accused's guilt or
innocence and making recommendations as to mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 'Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure' (adopted 7 November 2000),
Section 15. Online on the OSCE Mission in Kosovo website, http://www.osce.org/
kosovo/
77. The MAB's review power does not appear to extend to decisions of the MHB as to
guilt or innocence. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, Section 4.2(c) [MAB's
review limited to 'sanctions imposed by the Temporary Media Commissioner'];
and 'Media Hearing Board Rules of Procedure' (adopted 7 November 2000),
Section 17 [decisions of the MHB are not normally subjecno appeal]. It is possible
that the question of Section 4.2(c) reflects simply a failure to revise UNMIK
Regulation 2000/36 following the November 2000 creation of the MHB. However,
Section 17 is quite explicit.
78. The MAB, upon reviewing Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37, has concluded that it
is not competent to review acts of the SRSG. See Belul Beqaj and the Newspaper
Dita, Appellant and Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE, Respondent, paras
54-6; Sylejman Aliu and the Newspaper Bota Sot, Appellant and Temporary Media
Commission, OSCE, Respondent, para. 64.
79. 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo', S/1999/779 (12 July 1999), Online Uune 2001], available at
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http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm paras. S2-3 include the
following:
UNMIK has the unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundation for democratic and professional media in Kosovo . . . UNMIK will support the
emergence of independent media and will monitor compliance with international media standards. The Special Representative will appoint a media
regulatory commission to manage the frequency spectrum, establish broadcast
and press codes of conduct, and issue licences ... In facing the challenge of
fostering the development of independent media in Kosovo, UNMIK will
promote a media culture based on democratic principles.
SO. See detailed reports in the contributions of Thompson and De Luce, and of
Thompson and Mertus to this volume (Chapters 7 and 9). The New York Times
disparagingly characterized the module as an 'international media ministry' in
'Kosovo's Incipient Media Ministry' (30 August 1999).
S1. On at least one occasion, acts taken in operation of the module have had an impact
outside the post-conflict zone. In April 2001, a news distributor in Switzerland,
fearing violation of that country's anti-racism laws, decided to discontinue
distribution of the newspaper Bota Sot. Reportedly, the decision was taken
following the TMC's denunciation of Bota Sot for published statements regarding
the tense situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See 'Switzerland: Albanian Paper Banned from Sale for Inciting Ethnic Hatred,' BBC
Monitoring World Media Service, 10 April 2001.

